



# Section 8

EO-1 Lessons Learned / Summary



### Lessons Learned (1 of 5)



June 4, 2002

- When compared to a small science mission, NMP missions are inherently RISKY:
  - Maturing the technologies
  - Architectural risks
  - Developing the technologies
  - Flight-validating the technologies
  - Infusing the technologies
- Mitigating these risks requires:
  - Greater reserves of time and money
  - More capable people
  - Robust Risk Management
  - Strong System Engineering is ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL in orchestrating a successful NMP mission
  - Ready and repeated access to the best engineering talent is routinely required



# Lessons Learned (2 of 5)



June 4, 2002

- NMP missions are not important in and of themselves, BUT where they lead
- ♦ Enabling future science missions is the primary function of any NMP mission
- OMB expects infusion to be direct and obvious
- Effective infusion is a stumbling block for the entire NASA technology program – not just NMP
- However, NMP must solve this problem or die trying
- Flight projects are independent and do not like entanglements with technology providers in other NASA projects
- ◆ HQ can encourage infusion, but probably cannot enforce it
- Center management can also encourage infusion, but is not inclined to push too hard
- It probably falls to Programs to manage infusion
- To be effective, programs need to have some influence on technology development and validation prior to infusion



# Lessons Learned (3 of 5)



- Who should do an NMP mission?
- ◆ So far, ONLY JPL and GSFC have had successful NMP missions
- ◆ All NMP mission get into trouble due to their higher risk
- With a "deep bench" of engineering expertise, you solve the problems and move on
- Without this engineering expertise, you may stall out and be cancelled
- ♦ With all of these difficulties, are NMP missions worth doing?



### Lessons Learned (4 of 5)



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- The jury is still out, but based on the testimony we heard:
  - Infusion must become more sophisticated than "Build it and they will use it"
  - Infusing into a single large mission will rarely save enough money to pay for the NMP mission
  - Infusing into multiple missions works best at the box level
  - Hence, the NMP is being turned into a Multi-mission Box Program
- Large science missions that are critically dependent on new technologies will include their own flight validation mission in their planning
- ◆ Small science missions are not generally good infusion targets for new technologies because of strict cost caps and modest reserves
- ◆ The NMP must become much smarter about its infusion targets



# Lessons Learned (5 of 5)



June 4, 2002

#### What have we learned from EO-1?

- Technology validation missions are risky and difficult
- In the right situation and in the right hands, they can be affordably successful and valuable to one or more future science missions
- In the end, these missions are justified because they are programmatically necessary and not because they are costeffective
- Most will be associated with large science missions that are critically dependent on new, unvalidated technologies



# Summary



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- The EO-1 mission is responsive to the 1992 Land Remote Sensing Act wherein NASA will use advanced technology to ensure Landsat data continuity
- ◆ It has convincingly flight-validated improvements in:
  - Multispectral imaging
  - Hyperspectral imaging
  - Calibration
  - Atmospheric Correction
  - Spacecraft technologies useful to remote sensing
- The baseline mission has been completed and is now in an Extended Mission based on a partnership with the USGS
- ◆ It now functions as an orbital testbed for new applications
- The best may be yet to come!
- Selected EO-1 imagery and this presentation are available at <a href="http://eo1.gsfc.nasa.gov/miscPages/home.html">http://eo1.gsfc.nasa.gov/miscPages/home.html</a>

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